'It is mostly around the Timaeus that the issue of the value of Platonic myth is raised'. The claim, crude as it may appear, does at least highlight the importance of the dialogue's cosmological questions: are we talking about myth in the sense of ' ction'? If so, an extreme interpretation, by and large denying the Platonic myth any truly philosophical value, would result in the bewildering conclusion that the explanation of the universe in the Timaeus is by no means Platonic per se, while more moderate and recent readings should eventually succeed in unravelling what is metaphoric and what is not, or even in 'reading through the metaphor'. Are we dealing with a discourse that is chie y narrative, albeit not ctional, and that should mostly be interpreted literally? In that case the divine craftsman's fashioning of a world 'born' or 'become' would be part and parcel of Plato's philosophy; but then one knotty task would still remain to be addressed: reducing those apparent inconsistencies in the text that are pointed out by the advocates of the opposite interpretation. Our purpose in this paper is not to re-open the whole thorny case, but to examine the Timaeus' muthos from two different angles, both revealing its singularity: rst, what makes it stand out among other Platonic myths, i.e. the well-known eikôs muthos quali cation; next, because it relates to the world as mimêma, it is of all other Platonic myths the one most directly and overtly dedicated to an image, an 'eikôn' * Translated from French by Jean-Charles Khalifa.
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Brochard (1974), 49. See respectively Brochard (ibid., 48) criticizing the abovementioned radical interpretation, and Brisson (1998 Brisson ( [1974 ), 105.
Mainly concerning: chaos (obviously predating the ordering by the Demiurge, but 'visible' and which therefore should be 'become' as any sensible being); time (produced with the world, but can this production take place elsewhere than in a pre-existing time?); soul (how can its self-movingness be reconciled with its being constituted from the outside by the Demiurge?). Cf. Vlastos (1965ab); contra: Cherniss (1944 ), Tarán (1971 .
The Allegory of the Cave might arguably be said to be also dedicated to image; however: 1) Plato does not call it muthos, but only eikôn (515a4, 517a8, 517d1); and, as most scholars rightly assume, it is best quali ed as allegory rather than myth; 2) moreover, it does not relate promoted to 'sensible God' status (92c7); the cross-examination of both angles leading us to discuss the relationship of eikôs muthos to the issue of likeness and mimesis.
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Admittedly, the dialogue gives the myth a 'head' (69b1-2), but it also veils it; indeed, the interpretation di culties concerning the status of cosmology are to be analysed within a broader context where the logos-muthos boundaries are remarkably blurred. For the Timaeus, even as it provides hermeneutics with an enigmatic, savoury meta-discursive richness, embeds the myth-or rather a series of myths-in a mise en abyme and specular game. The former (partly presented as embedded true logoi, not muthoi) is quite obvious: Critias' narrative to Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue is presented as an extended version of his earlier 'narrative' (logos, 20d1), in which he recounted Solon's 'logos' (as told by Critias the Elder), which 'though strange (atopos), is entirely true'. (20d7-8) However, over and above the mise en abyme expressing the myth's irrational ingredient as well as its sacredness and immemorialness, there appears a specular game in which the embedded discourses endlessly re ect the mythhood itself. Indeed, within Critias' narrative, the myth category applies rst to (a) what the Greeks consider their 'most venerable' stories, e.g. the rst man and the Deluge, told by Solon to the Egyptian priests (22a4-b3), one of whom derides them as children's myths (23b5). The allegedly historical knowledge is dissolved in myth because of the Greeks' childish lack of memory of their own origins. Here, 'muthos', as is the case of Phaethon's chariot in 22c7-d1, stands in sharp contrast to 'truth'. Which is de nitely not the case of (b) the atopic story of the origins of Athens and its war against Atlantis, indeed presented by Critias as an 'entirely true' logos (20d7-8), and after him by Socrates as 'genuine history' (alêthinon logon) as opposed to 'fabricated' to an image (nor to the constitution of an image) but rather uses the theme and vocabulary of image to represent an object that is rst and foremost the philosopher's own path.
More generally speaking, a relation between myth and game can famously be read in Tim. 59c5-d2.
The previous day (20c6-d1; 26a7-b2); and in the morning (26c3-7). Cornford's translation (1952 [1937] ) hereafter, and except when explicitly noted my reference translation of Timaeus.
παίδων (…) µύθων.
